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Behold: Silence and Attention in Education 
 
Abstract: 
Educators continually ask about the best means to engage students and how 
best to capture attention. These concerns often make the problematic 
assumption that students can directly govern their own attention. In order to 
address the role and limits of attention in education, some theorists have 
sought to recover the significance of silence or mindfulness in schools, but I 
argue that these approaches are too simplistic. A more fundamental 
examination of our conceptions of identity and agency reveals a Cartesian 
and Kantian foundationalism. This assumed subjectivity establishes too 
simplistic a conception of the agency of students in directing attention. I 
critically engage with these conceptions by drawing on a range of diverse 
sources, primarily modern Continental philosophy and Christian mystical 
theology. 
____  
What is the role of attention in education? In what follows I argue that 
attention should be distinguished from concentration, mindfulness, or mental 
focus. In an everyday sense we are able to direct our awareness to specific 
objects and situations, and in this sense our attention is amenable to 
subjective intention. However, I am concerned to distinguish the awareness 
that we can control from an aspect of attention that eludes the simple direction 
of the will. Whereas concentration, mindfulness, and mental focus can to 
some extent be controlled, managed and developed, I want to draw attention 
to a foundational moment of awareness that eludes efforts to manage or 
develop attention. This aspiration could strike the reader as confused or 
paradoxical since I am seeking to direct the attention of the reader while 
making the claim that attention cannot be directed. However, I would certainly 
hesitate to make the strong claim that attention cannot be directed at all, but 
rather to show that there must be a moment of awareness that in some 
respects is prior to the engagement of intended concentration. This moment 
of awareness is fundamental to knowledge, experience, and education. In 
developing the argument, I relate this moment of awareness to the theological 
tradition, but in ways that are to some extent evocative rather than fully 
elaborated. This is a deliberate strategy since the concern (or reference) of 
this paper is best understood not simply cognitively or propositionally, but also 
aesthetically or experientially. 
I begin by exploring some theological connotations of the word µEHKROG¶ WR
consider the sense in which our attention is held E\ VRPHWKLQJ µRWKHU¶ To 
behold something is, in a certain sense, to submit ourselves to it, go give 
ourselves to be held, to become silent. It is to become entirely open and 
receptive to what is present. This mode of attentive receptivity has been 
understood as the ground of learning for a range of thinkers such as William 
James, Simone Weil, and Jiddu Krishnamurti. This conception of attention is 
contrasted with more willful forms of attention that are common currency in 
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educational discourse. But the fault line between what we can and cannot 
control speaks of a foundational moment in which the spirit of learning is born.  
This article is only a first step along a longer path that aims to retrieve insights 
from the theological tradition for pedagogy. Our so-called post-secular context 
(Habermas 2008), in which the quest for a utopia without religion is no longer 
a cultural preoccupation, offers an opportunity to reassess the contributions of 
the theological tradition. Having said that, the main contours of the argument 
do not, I believe, depend on the perspective offered by any particular religious 
tradition, and so I would wish to locate this paper in a yet to be defined space 
that is neither secular nor confessional. 
 
Behold 
Behold may be the WHDFKHU¶V essential word. Whatever else teachers do, they 
draw the attention of students to things. As in the Platonic allegory, the 
teacher drags the student from the cave of ignorance and, standing in the light 
of truth, gestures or speaks the essential word: behold. To say behold does 
not affirm the authority of the teacher. Rather it recognizes the autonomy of 
the student in the apprehension of being, and the agency of the world in the 
givenness of things. 
Although Behold is an archaic sounding word it is still used in a way that 
denotes giving regard to something, or holding a thing in view. It can also 
connote being caught by something as though beheld by it. More often where 
we come across the word these days it can sound ornamental, rhetorical, or 
comical without much significance or µFDVK-YDOXH¶ %XW WKLV impression is 
mistaken. Behold is related to the German halten to hold, originally meaning 
to keep, tend, watch over, or restrain. It calls us to attend, but also holds or 
even restrains that attention. It has particular resonance in theological 
context 1  though such resonance does, I think, suggest a broader 
epistemological and pedagogical structure.  
To behold is not to interpret, analyse, or take into account. Rather it speaks at 
the point of world-disclosure: it can be said to speak the world. It is, as Maggie 
5RVVSXWV LW ³D OLPLQDOZRUG LWVLJQDOV WKH WKUHVKROGRIFRQWHPSODWLRQZKHUH
the self-conscious mind stops analysing and becomes attentively receptive, 
open in an ungrasping and self-emptying way to irruption from the deep mind´
(Ross 2013, p. 29-30). Is it possible that in beholding the world we can see 
things before, as it were, they are represented as objects? Does the moment 
of beholding take place before educators get involved and start putting things 
in boxes? And is education not concerned more with the comprehension and 
explanation that follows apprehension or immersion? These questions reflect 
the epistemological tensions emerging in the nineteenth century Continental 
hermeneutical tradition between primary phenomenological experience 
(Erlebnis) and secondary hermeneutical understanding (Verstehen). For now 
such wider perspectives will have to remain on the horizon. But the extent to 
which education should be concerned with the boundless present prior to 
analytical and critical scrutiny remains a complex question. Perhaps schools, 
colleges, and universities should do more to encourage quiet times, pauses, 
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reflections, and silences, to create spaces for attention and contemplation. Of 
course many schools structure silence and contemplation, some, like Quaker, 
Maharishi, and Krishnamurti schools, in quite distinctive ways. Helen Lees 
has provided a survey of the significance of silence in schools where she 
begins the important task of distinguishing forms of silence beyond simply the 
absence of noise (Lees 2012). Lees argues for µstrong silence¶ as a positive 
force in education, as distinct from the forced negative silences that too often 
structure school experience. This is important work but could draw more upon 
the philosophical and theological traditions in which the phenomenology of 
silence is so richly developed.  
It has often been noted that silence is not just the absence of noise (Picard 
1972; Caranfa 2004; Lees 2010). But the notion that silence is constituted by 
attention ± that it cannot exist without attention - is less often discussed 
(Krishnamurti 1996). The call for silence in schools might be helpfully recast in 
terms of a call to attention. But this is surely nothing like the WHDFKHU¶V YDLQ
repetition: pay attention. 
 
Pay Attention 
These words quickly become hollow prescriptions for improved performance 
and so we should be attentive to such formulas. In 1890 the philosopher and 
psychologist William James bemoaned the fact that philosophers had largely 
ignored the faculty of attention. James encouraged the consideration of 
attention in education: 
the faculty of voluntarily bringing back a wandering attention, over and 
over again, is the very root of judgment, character, and will. No one is 
compos sui if he have it not. An education which should improve this 
faculty would be the education par excellence (James 1890, Chapter 
11).  
We will see that Simone Weil similarly argued that the central concern of 
pedagogy ought to be training in attention. Today much research continues to 
assume that attention is something to be trained (Lotz et. al. 2009) particularly 
where attention is identified with concentration or mindfulness. But even for 
James there are ambiguities with the idea of training the faculty of attention: 
But it is easier to define this ideal [of improving attention] than to give 
practical directions for bringing it about. The only general pedagogic 
maxim bearing on attention is that the more interest the child has in 
advance in the subject, the better he will attend. Induct him therefore in 
such a way as to knit each new thing on to some acquisition already 
there; and if possible awaken curiosity, so that the new thing shall 
seem to come as an answer, or part of an answer, to a question pre-
existing in his mind (James 1890, Chapter 11).  
But of course the awakening of curiosity itself raises as many difficulties as 
does the directing attention. There are no guaranteed methods to achieve 
either. These practical problems are often hidden by the assumption that 
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attention is a given condition of education. If educational theory considers the 
wider role of attention in education, it tends to be concerned with deficits of 
attention and the attendant problems of diagnosis and treatment. 7KLVµGHILFLW
PRGHO¶ RI DWWHQWLRQ DVVXPHV DQ XQYHULILDEOH QRUP WKDW IRU WKH PRVW SDUW 
students are able to direct, control, and manage attention. As such, attention 
is the tacit ground of education, something we all assume to be present. From 
this perspective it seems self-evident that teachers are able to command 
students to pay attention.  
And, of course, in the everyday sense of the word, this is true. Teachers do 
expect students to pay attention or concentrate and educators have a range 
of strategies to manage the attention of their students. But I want to 
complicate this view by indicating that, rather like beholding, there is 
something about attention that cannot be demanded, still less coerced. 
Attention is capable of involuntary wandering as much as voluntary control. 
Our attention is drawn out of itself by the cry of the infant, by the beauty of the 
work of art, or by the pain of toothache. Advertisers expend vast resources 
ZLWKLQ WKH µDWWHQWLRQHFRQRP\¶ (Davenport and Beck, 2001) seeking effective 
means for capturing attention. Of course we can resist efforts to manipulate 
attention, but very often we follow our attention, not the other way around. 
It is hardly surprising then that in the classroom the student remains similarly 
directed: the student is not simply commanding their attention, but often 
following it. The will of the student can, no doubt, intervene to direct matters 
and here we might say that the student offers the teacher their attention. But 
good teachers know how often certain simple techniques can draw the 
attention of students without such directedness.   
I want to suggest that there is a fundamental aspect of attention that is given, 
not just from the teacher to the student, but at a more subtle level, to the 
student herself. The gift of attention is a gift both to the student (as giver) and 
the teacher (as receiver), in which both are blessed. I will briefly turn to a 
PRPHQW IURP 6KDNHVSHDUH¶V SOD\ The Merchant of Venice to illustrate this 
idea. The narrative comes to a point of crisis when Shylock asks under what 
FRPSXOVLRQKHVKRXOGVKRZPHUF\ WRKLVGHEWRU$QWRQLR7KHSOD\¶VKHURLQH
Portia famously replies: 
The quality of mercy is not strain'd, 
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven 
Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest: 
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes. (The Merchant of Venice) 
Mercy, it seems, cannot be demanded, but rather gently falls. The possibility 
that mercy shall be shown depends, in no small measure upon the agency of 
Shylock, but his own perspective is itself subject to what gently falls from 
heaven. I want to suggest that attention, like mercy, is under no compulsion. 
The student who pays attention is offering a gift to the teacher while also 
paradoxically being given that moment of attention itself. In a sense, attention 
droppeth as the gentle rain, blessing both him that gives and him that receives 
the attention.  
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This is somewhat different to the concentration or trained mindfulness that is 
sometimes associated with attention. More specifically, this raises questions 
of identity: who is in control and who is responsible? Very often the question 
of identity is problematically structured by a polarized conception of agency: 
too often passivity and activity are regarded as polar opposites. Elsewhere I 
have argued that the obsolete linguistic mode of the middle voice reflects a 
mode of being which is some way between activity and passivity, and that this 
mode of being has been unable to resist the sedimentation of the modern 
subject (REMOVED). In other words, there exists a point of action in which 
the intention and agency of the person and the world intermingle, a moment 
captured in the grammatical cleavage between active and passive voice.2 
Modern English no longer uses this grammatical form, reflecting the fact that 
our modern conception of subjectivity assumes an unequivocal agency. This 
connection between linguistic identity and subjectivity preoccupies much of 
0DUWLQ+HLGHJJHU¶s later work and so it is here that we find interesting ways to 
explore the relation between attention and the will. 
The anthropology developed by Heidegger (whether as early Dasein or later 
conceptions as the clearing of Being) reflects the grammatical cleavage of the 
middle voice by locating Being and human being in the space between activity 
and passivity (see Davis 2007)+HLGHJJHU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKHKHUPHQHXWLF
SURMHFW LVLQSDUWKLVFRQFHSWLRQRIµUHYHDOLQJ¶ (Heidegger 1977) RUµGLVFORVLYH
ORRNLQJ¶ (Rojcewicz 2005) in which agency is not to be found at the polar 
regions of identity, but rather in the mediate gathering of the middle voice. 
This has left Heidegger open to the criticism that he equivocates on his 
philosophical (and political) commitments; that, for example, the destiny of 
technological thinking is paradoxically both determining us, and determined by 
us leaving no clear statement of what is to be (or indeed can be) done 
(Heidegger 1977). We are left without a clear method of approach to the 
problems of our age. +HLGHJJHU¶V understanding of agency here is not 
incidentally related to the question of attention but centrally so. His 
philosophical movement can be interpreted as an elaboration of the nature of 
attention, whether in terms of care as the structure of Dasein (Heidegger 
1996), thinking as thanking (Heidegger 1976) and the meditative thinking of 
his Discourse on Thinking (Heidegger 1970), or man as the µVKHSKHUG RI
Being¶ (Heidegger 1993); the complexity of attention mirrors the complexity of 
identity itself because attention is significantly constitutive of Dasein. We 
could take this further if we consider how language is also constitutive of the 
world of Being and human being. In a certain sense, all speech grants the 
world and intimates the tripartite gathering of the beholding. This is because 
all speech requires a speaker, a hearer, and a world, and is therefore the 
³clearing-concealing aGYHQW RI %HLQJ LWVHOI´ Heidegger 1993, p. 230). This 
GHWRXU LQWR +HLGHJJHU¶V SKLORVRSK\ ORFDWHV WKH TXHVWLRQ RI DWWHQWLRQ ZLWKLQ
mainstream philosophical discourse. Nevertheless, it is the religious traditions 
that offer the richest account of the paradox of attention. 
 
The Paradox of Attention 
What Marvin Shaw (Shaw 2010) calls the paradox of intention describes this 
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complex situation rather more simply: that we may reach a goal by giving up 
the attempt to reach it or, conversely, that we may be prevented from 
reaching a goal by our intentional efforts to achieve it. Religious traditions the 
world over warn of the propensity on the part of the novice to become 
preoccupied with the observance of ritual which can be the very thing that 
prevents the attention that is central to ritual itself. This is why Christian 
theologians are often ambivalent about structured religious practices. Meister 
Eckhart, to take one example, extols the pilgrim: 
Leave place, leave time 
Avoid even image! 
Go forth without a way 
On the narrow path, 
Then you will find the desert track (Quoted in McGinn, 2001, p. 114). 
 
Here the track that the novice walks along becomes an aspect of projected 
will that must be subverted. %XW WR µGR¶ WKLV, to set upon this via negativa is 
always in tension with itself. To understand that a significant part of education 
is structured by this tension is crucial. The divergence of progressive 
education from traditional formal pedagogy, for example, could be identified 
with the recognition of the complexity of will and attention. This is because 
progressive educators highlight the spontaneous, organic, or µnon-directive¶ 
forms of learning, where the goals of the educational process are less than 
clear. Progressive educators tend to emphasise the facilitative role of the 
teacher in contrast to a more directive approach associated with traditional 
pedagogy. From a progressive point of view directing attention is not a 
straightforward intentional act that we can employ to the disciplined 
appropriation of the facts, or a cognitive tool at our disposal. Rather genuine 
attention involves a submission of the self to the other which cannot be simply 
structured or enforced (REMOVED).  
Speaking from a broadly progressive perspective, the philosopher Jiddu 
Krishnamurti calls WUXWKD³SDWKOHVVODQG´Krishnamurti 1996, p. 257) echoing 
the paradox of intention at the heart of pedagogy. There are no paths, ways, 
or hows, when it comes to the matter of attention, since attention is pure act. 
Indeed the desire to focus attention is peculiarly susceptible to the delusions 
of intention since what we think we are harnessing when we µfocus the mind¶ 
can itself be a representational or analytical construction that inhibits the 
freedom of total attention. Of course, this difficulty pertains to meditation more 
generally. We project our intention to achieve a goal which results not in the 
goal itself, but in the image or projection of the idealized goal. The danger 
here is that we inadvertently displace or extinguish WKH µIODPH RI DWWHQWLRQ¶
Krishnamurti has much to say about the significance of attention in education: 
Learning in the true sense of the word is possible only in that state of 
attention, in which there is no outer or inner compulsion. ... It is 
attention that allows silence to come upon the mind, which is the 
RSHQLQJ RI WKH GRRU WR FUHDWLRQ« +RZ LV WKH VWDWe of attention to be 
brought about? It cannot be cultivated through persuasion, comparison, 
UHZDUGRUSXQLVKPHQWDOORIZKLFKDUHIRUPVRIFRHUFLRQ«<RXFDQ
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WHDFKFRQFHQWUDWLRQEXWDWWHQWLRQFDQQRWEHWDXJKW«DWWHQWLRQDULVHV
spontaneously when around the student there is an atmosphere of 
well-being, when he has the feeling of being secure, of being at ease, 
and is aware of the disinterested action that comes with 
love. (Krishnamurti 1963, p. 102) 
In my experience Krishnamurti schools endeavour to create this atmosphere 
of well-being in which students can feel at ease. 3  But here Krishnamurti 
seems to set up a structure in which attention leads to silence, a silence which 
then opens up to creation (we must be careful not to fall into the temptation to 
construct a system out of an approach that is very clearly antagonistic to the 
pervasive tendency to structure what can only be beheld). This is interesting 
to educators because the process of engaging the attention is ultimately 
concerned not with silence for its own sake, but contact with, and 
contemplation of, the other. If we can speak of the goal of attention then 
surely it must be related to the idea of being taken up by what Krishnamurti 
here calls creation. Perhaps Krishnamurti intends something like the 
hermeneutic structure of disclosive looking or world disclosure that is, as I 
suggested earlier, an expression of beholding.  
There is a common sense view of this attention in which awareness is fully 
present to itself in an ahistorical and groundless way. ,QVSHDNLQJRIµEHKROG¶
it is tempting to think of attention as a kind of ground zero, a Cartesian or 
Archimedean point from which the world emanates. This disclosure is in 
danger of being framed as some sort of ahistorical singularity. .ULVKQDPXUWL¶V
IRFXVRQWKHµFKRLFHOHVVDZDUHQHVV¶RISXUHDWWHQWLRQZKLFKLVassociated with 
what he has called the µHQGing RIWLPH¶ (Krishnamurti 1985) and µWRWDOIUHHGRP¶ 
(Krishnamurti 1996), might appear to arise out of just such a naïve ahistorical 
attitude in which all conditioning falls away and we see not shadows or 
reflections (Krishnamurti often speaks of how our conditioning leads us to see 
only images), but we behold what is. It would require another essay to explore 
KRZ.ULVKQDPXUWL¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQDYRLGs the naivete of assuming we 
should escape our historicality. In essence his concern is to perceive human 
conditioning itself thereby achieving something of a freedom in relation to it, 
rather than seeking to escape entirely conditioning itself, but this is a delicate 
issue which is beyond my present scope.  
There are other conceptions of attention that move us away from a µnatural 
attitude¶ that sees attention in foundational terms (I use foundational here to 
echo the tradition of Cartesian foundationalism that might seek the cogito in a 
moment of pure attention where the self, and nothing but the self, is evident to 
itself). The tradition of phenomenological hermeneutics, most directly 
associated with Heidegger and Gadamer, offers a range of different but 
related conceptions of attention as always already constituted and formed 
through social and psychological contexts. Such accounts of being-in-the-
world are explicitly engaged with the temporality and historicity of existence. 
The hermeneutic tradition seeks to restore the significance of historical 
existence to phenomenology. More recently, Bernard Stiegler has wanted to 
include our technological apparatus into the constitution of attention 
suggesting that the short route to self-awareness (by way of some self-
certifying Cartesian foundationalism) is misconceived (Stiegler, p. 18).4 This 
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range of issues underscores the fundamental significance of attention as a 
topic that has received surprisingly scant consideration within philosophy of 
education. 
Thus far the main difficulty that we have come across is that there is a 
problem with suggesting that the will can directly command attention. 
Elements of the continental philosophical tradition, of Christian theology, and 
of progressive education have been somewhat helpful in sketching out a 
conception of will that undercuts some of the difficulties here. I now want to 
turn to some other ways in which educators understand attention beyond the 
deficit model. 
 
Intended Attention 
Over recent years, mindfulness techniques have become increasingly 
DSSHDOLQJWRHGXFDWRUV0LQGIXOQHVVLQVFKRROVSURMHFWVVXFKDVµE¶DQGWKH
research undertaken by the Oxford Mindfulness Centre have responded to a 
recognition that too narrow a conception of education cannot be healthy. In 
part because the movement of mindfulness generally presents itself as 
religiously and ideologically neutral, it has been the natural partner for broadly 
secular, public institutions like schools. Perhaps mindfulness is believed to 
remedy the social ills that were once more widely treated (or suppressed) by 
institutional religions. But the range of differing techniques, philosophies, and 
attitudes that are placed under the banner of mindfulness should give us 
pause before we get involved. The sense that a specific mindfulness practice 
can be employed to address individual and social ills such as stress or social 
instability, or that it might enhance creativity or generally provide a sense of 
fulfillment, could be regarded as suspiciously reductive or utilitarian (Picard 
1972, pp. 2-3). But equally problematic is the idea that mindfulness practice is 
within the direct compass of the will. For Ross it is this intentional aspect of 
mindfulness that places it apart from beholding (Ross 2013, p. 33). If the 
emergent discourse of secularized mindfulness is incomplete, what can our 
religious traditions offer instead? This is not an easy question to answer, and 
here I can only offer suggestive remarks. 
In De Magistro St Augustine says that the student "is taught not by words, but 
by the realities themselves made manifest to him directly by God revealing 
them to his inner self" (De Magistro, 40). $XJXVWLQH¶V 3Oatonic disposition 
seems evident in his conception of education as a form of bearing witness. 
The idea that teaching is bearing witness and learning is beholding would sit 
well with an Augustinian pedagogy. The balance of emphasis shifts between 
these understandings: bearing witness emphasizes the role of the teacher, 
while beholding places the student (along with the world) centre stage. More 
broadly, the Christian mystical tradition associates silence and contemplation 
with a relinquishment of self more widely relevant to education. This tradition 
has formulated stages of prayer that follow a roughly threefold pattern of 
recollection, quietude, and union (Underhill 2012).5 From this perspective, the 
religious subject undergoes a transition from their activity and concentrated 
efforts in recollection, to a mode of relinquishing that activity and submission 
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of the self to the darkness, or emptiness of God in quietude. Finally, union 
with God may be achieved, though the less said about that the better. The 
transition from the concentrated power of recollection to the submissive 
attention of quietude entails the relinquishment of the self as subjective agent.  
This tradition (or range of traditions) has often sought to educate the novice 
into the recognition of his ultimate impotence before God. Yet the subject 
must take that step along the path to relinquish the path. Christian theologians 
such as St Augustine, St Bernard of Clairvaux, Meister Eckhart, St Teresa of 
Avila, St John of the Cross and so on, all suggest something like a structure in 
which the religious subject comes to know God through a process of 
abandoning the images, impressions and representations of God (Turner 
1996). At the end of this path of negation, this via negativa, are we left with 
nothing? Yes and no. What is left in the contemplative desert of the mind is 
nothing human made: nothing but God who is, strictly speaking, nothing. In 
other words, in attention we become nothing. As Simone Weil puts it, ³2QFH
we have understood we are nothing, the object of all our efforts is to become 
QRWKLQJ´(Weil 1987, p. 30).. And for Weil those efforts must be attentive and 
SUD\HUIXOVLQFHDVVKHSXWVLW³DEVROXWHO\XQPL[HGDWWHQWLRQLVSUD\HU´ (Weil 
1959, p. 106).   
 
Weil and Murdoch on Attention 
It is a good point to introduce Weil into the discussion since her work 
encapsulates a tension present in the foregoing discussion. Weil seems to 
understand that attention eludes efforts to become too directly attached to the 
will, and yet she wants to make attention a central focus of education, even 
the primary locus of instruction. As we will see, this tension is extremely 
fruitful for developing a nuanced conception of attention in education. :HLO¶V
ideas are also relevant insofar as they illuminate the sense in which education 
involves a negation of the self. Peter Roberts KDV SRLQWHG RXW KRZ :HLO¶V
conception of self-negation runs counter to the spirit of our times, especially in 
HigKHU(GXFDWLRQZKHUH ³WKHUH LVHYHU\ LQFHQWLYH WREHFRPHVHOI-centred; to 
focus more on ourselves, not less´ (Roberts 2011, p. 324). Weil remains a 
controversial figure in the history of Christian mysticism, a politically active 
and provocative figure whose legacy has been debated and derided as well 
as admired (Roberts 2011; McClellan 1990). 
For Weil attention is of primary significance for education, for life, and for faith. 
Running through much of her work is a view of attention as something that 
can be taught, but also that does not respond directly to the will. At points 
:HLOVHHVDWWHQWLRQDVWKH³UHDOREMHFWDQGDOPRVWWKHVROHLQWHUHVWRIVWXGLHV´
(Weil 1959, p. 66); that with the right kind of discipline and effort, attention can 
EH FXOWLYDWHG LQ VWXGHQWV ³7HDFKLQJ´ VD\V :HLO ³VKRXOG KDYH QR RWKHU DLP
EXWWRSUHSDUHE\WUDLQLQJWKHDWWHQWLRQIRUWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIVXFKDQDFW´Weil 
1959, p. 108) namely to fully attend to something. On the other hand, Weil 
wants to maintain some separation of attention from will. She suggests that 
the personal will, with its concern to fix itself on a particular problem 
constitutes a dependency at odds with the purity of desire for which the infinite 
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(God) is the only pure object of desire. Grace is not far away in this account of 
our relation to attention. :HLO¶V conception of grace is expressed in her 
Platonic notion that attention responds almost spontaneously as though a 
PDJQHWLF IRUFH RI DWWUDFWLRQ FRPPDQGV LW ³$ GLYLQH LQVSLUDWLRQ RSHUDWHV
infallibly, if we do not turn away our attention, if we do not refuse it. There is 
not a choice to be made in its favour, it is enough not to refuse to recognize 
that it exists´ :HLO  S . The force of grace is felt as a negative 
capability, an original kenosis, in which the will can operate by its power to not 
refuse the movement it is drawn into. 
While I have argued for an understanding that attention is not within the direct 
purview of the will, I acknowledge the sense in which something like the right 
kind of effort can be employed to create conditions in which attention can 
flower. I would suggest that Weil might well offer some insight for this 
understanding, though most clearly through an indirect route. Iris Murdoch 
SURYLGHVDZLGHUFRQWH[W LQWRZKLFKWKHP\VWLFDOVWUDLQRI:HLO¶VWKLQNLQJFDQ
be understood. It seems that Weil incorporates a complex theological 
anthropology but in somewhat terse and apparently contradictory terms, and 
so it is helpful that Murdoch provides an elaboration (albeit only implicit) so 
that the apparent contradiction in Weil can be maintained as a fruitful tension.  
,Q µ7KH ,GHD RI 3HUIHFWLRQ¶ (Murdoch 1970) Murdoch proceeds by 
problematizing the conceptions of identity, freedom, will, and decision that 
moral philosophy has expounded or assumed. Philosophical debate about the 
VWDWXVRIGHFLVLRQKDVWHQGHGLQ0XUGRFK¶VDFFRXQWWRIRllow what she calls 
an existentialist-behaviourist philosophy of action. There is in this account a 
Cartesian and Kantian legacy in which the inescapable responsibility of an 
autonomous cogito must be affirmed. While this anthropology is unequivocal 
in assuring the agent has moral responsibility, its natural corollary turns out to 
be forms of determinism or fatalism. If this responsibility is denied or 
threatened in some fundamental way, then the self as such seems to be in 
danger. 6LQFH0XUGRFK¶VWLPHDQDlytical philosophy seems to be struggling to 
defend a locus of agency as neuroscientific research seems to encroach ever 
further upon the stages of human decision making, leaving scarcely any place 
for the still centre of decision (see, for example, Brassier 2010). The ipseity of 
Cartesian foundationalism has nowhere to hide. But Murdoch provides us 
here with some resources to escape this reductive bind, and to explore 
identity and agency without committing to the either/or of Kantian/Cartesian 
subjectivity: that we are either fully rational agents, or we are fully determined 
patients.  
Murdoch elaborates her point by using an example of a mother (whom she 
calls M) and her daughter-in-law (called D). M feels that her son has married 
beneath him, a view that encourages certain perceptions/judgments M 
has/makes of D; D is regarded as unpolished, lacking in dignity and 
refinement, tiresomely juvenile and so on. This image M has of D may settle 
and harden with time, sedimenting 0¶V LQWROHUDQFH. But there are other 
SRVVLELOLWLHV 0XUGRFK H[SORUHV WKH SRVVLELOLW\ WKDW 0¶V YLHZ RI ' FDQ VRIWHQ
and change even without any direct contact between the two women. For the 
sake of the argument Murdoch supposes that D is no longer around and 
never will be, thereE\HQVXULQJWKDW0¶VSHUFHSWLRQLVQRWDOWHUHGE\FKDQJHG
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actions by D, or by fresh information presented to M. Despite this lack of 
FRQWDFW 0¶V YLHZ LV DEOH WR VKLIW ³' LV GLVFRYHUHG WR EH QRW YXOJDU EXW
UHIUHVKLQJO\VLPSOHQRWXQGLJQLILHGEXWVSRQWDQHRXV«QRW WLUHVRPHO\ MXYHQLOH
EXWGHOLJKWIXOO\\RXWKIXO´Murdoch 1970, p. 18) It is important to realize that in 
0XUGRFK¶V H[DPSOH 0¶V VKLIW LQ DWWLWXGH DULVHV WKURXJK an internal reflective 
process in which M perceives or attends to her attitudes and assumptions: ³,
am old-fashioned and conventional. I may be prejudiced and narrow-PLQGHG´
(Murdoch 1970, p. 17) and so on. 
Does M make a decision to change her view? Did she in the first place decide 
on the view of D she would take? For Murdoch it seems that decision exists 
within a flow of attitudes and experiences that draw our past, present and 
future together into a coherent narrative, or as Murdoch calls it ³WKH
continXRXV IDEULF RI RXU EHLQJ´ S  ,W ZRXOG EH ZURQJ WR VD\ WKDW QR
decision is made to take a particular attitude. But it would be no less wrong to 
say that a decision is made to take a particular attitude, and so it seems better 
WRVSHDNRIWKHPRWKHU¶Vorientation to her daughter-in-law. A simplistic binary 
conception of agency or decision is inadequate to account for much that we 
might call human action. Of course Murdoch is not the first to point this out 
(Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur make similar arguments though in rather 
different terms ± HJ+HLGHJJHU¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIEHLQJ-in-the-world speaks to 
very similar anthropological issues), but the connection between Murdoch and 
Weil makes the example worth developing. 
Interestingly, it is attention that LVNH\WR0XUGRFK¶VHPSOR\PHQWRI:HLO,I0
can attend to herself and the world then she has opened a possibility for 
insight into her own conditioned existence. The way we see the world (our 
orientation to being) offers us a structure in which certain possibilities for 
action are conceivable (and similarly other possibilities fall outside of what is 
conceivable and become invisible to us). There is, then, a horizon within 
which attention operates. A view of attention as a singularity, a moment of 
radical purity where all conditioning is transcended could QRW LQ 0XUGRFK¶s 
account, fully appreciate the structural context of attention. A timeless and 
ahistorical view of attention means only a conception of attention that is 
unaware of itself and is rather inattentive to itself ± it is, in some sense, a 
failure of attention. But the recognition of this historicality should not be 
interpreted as a negation of freedom since the conception of freedom is not to 
be identified with a pure unconditional voluntarism, of which Murdoch, among 
many others, is highly critical (Murdoch 1970, pp. 26-27).  
There can, therefore, be some sense in saying that attention is both 
responsive to the world, but also available to us to develop, but only if we can 
avoid the tendency to regard human agency in absolutist terms. As Murdoch 
VD\V³ZHKDYHWRDFFHSWDGDUNHU OHVVIXOO\FRQVFLRXV OHVVVWHDGLO\ UDWLRQDO
LPDJHRIWKHG\QDPLFVRIWKHKXPDQSHUVRQDOLW\´0XUGRFK 1970, pp. 43-44). 
And if we do, we can appreciate the sense in which our historicality and our 
projections constitute our being-in-the-world without wholly negating our 
agency. We are given an orientation to being in which our values and 
perceptions emerge. This orientation is not, of course, a fixed feature of the 
essentialist self but an apprehension that constitutes our being here now. It is 
part of the effort of education to attend to this orientation that, paradoxically, is 
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an important aspect of the power of attention. There are other more familiar 
examples of our orientation to reality offering us ways of being that similarly 
deconstruct the duality of freedom and determinism. For example, religious 
beliefs are neither simply chosen nor inherited; musical taste is rarely the pure 
expression of some universal aesthetic sensibility; and so on.  
 
Despite the significance of Murdoch to this analysis, there is a problem with 
her account. TKHPRWKHU¶VVKLIWLQJRULHQWDWLRQ WRKHUGDXJKWHU-in-law locates 
the truth of the situation too readily. M¶V perception of D as common and 
juvenile is regarded as false, a state of illusion (Murdoch 1970, p. 37). M is 
able, Murdoch says, WR GLUHFWO\ EUHDN WKURXJK WR WKH ³KRQHVW SHUFHSWLRQ RI
ZKDW LV UHDOO\ WKH FDVH´ Murdoch 1970, p. 38) through a moral process of 
patient and just discernment in which the daughter-in-law is perceived justly. It 
is not the morality of the process that is of concern here so much as the 
readiness with which Murdoch speaks of what is really the case. Murdoch is 
suggesting that the moment of attention can break apart the failures of 
attention (which really amounts to inattention), as though we can take a short 
route to an unmediated apprehension of the truth of being.  
Of course the relinquishment of self that attention entails does involve putting 
aside the images and projections of the other so that we can truly meet them 
in their singularity. This is why relinquishment, or as Weil calls it µGHFUHDWLRQ¶
(Weil 1987), can seem to be a return to the things as they are. But I want to 
emphasize that such singular contact cannot be regarded as utterly ahistorical. 
Therefore, I want to maintain the significance of attention that Weil and 
Murdoch develop while making explicit the hermeneutic dimension to their 
phenomenology of attention.  
I agree then, that our DELOLW\ WRPRYH WRZDUGVD ³PRUHKRQHVWSHUFHSWLRQ´ LV
something desirable, both personally but also educationally. But it would be 
better to understand these perceptions in their interpretive complexity: that 
they are ways of seeing (albeit more honest, and therefore better). This 
should indicate a move away from a false/true perception of a situation, to a 
worse/better interpretation of things. Finally, this is because the quality of 
interpretation directly correlates with the quality of attention. 
 
Conclusion 
An important aspect of effective education is that we are challenged and 
unsettled, that the assumptions and images that we carry with us are seen in 
the light of fresh attention to the world around us. Practices of silence might 
be helpful in creating the right space for this attention, though there are 
problems with this. Positive silence might be better understood as the 
affirmation of attention in which the noise of the self is lost in submission of 
the self to the other. 
The task of educators is surely to call attention to the world, and thereby to 
attention itself. In essence attention involves looking at ± or better, being with 
± the other, whether that other is the object of educational inquiry, or the 
student herself. From the theological perspective, the other is God. But in the 
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context of pedagogy, the other is the world that calls to be known by the 
student. It has been tempting to speak of this attention as involving a self-
emptying or self-negation. But too often such negations become the object of 
attention and lead, paradoxically, to inattention. There are no straightforward 
answers here. Attention seems to open a depth that cannot be fathomed, just 
DVHQFRXQWHULQJWKHRWKHUFDQQRWEHFRPSOHWHG%XWWKHQLVQ¶WWKDt the point? 
If it was fathomable it would, no doubt, be enframed and enclosed in the 
targets of the modern age. 
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1 0DJJLH5RVVFDOOVEHKROGWKH³PRVWLPSRUWDQWZRUGLQWKH%LEOH´5RVVSZKHUH
the chronicles of Scripture begin and end. As the translation of the Hebrew hinneh, behold is 
the first word God says to Adam and Eve after creating and blessing them. The Greek word 
Idou, also often translated as behold, is the last word that the risen Christ speaks to his 
GLVFLSOHVµ«EHKROG,DPZLWK\RXDOZD\VHYHQXQWRWKHHQGRIWKHZRUOG$PHQ¶Matthew 
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28: 20). Other Biblical terms also have similar resonance DQGSHUIRUPVLPLODUIXQFWLRQVµOR¶
µ\HD¶µVHH¶DQGµVXGGHQO\¶ 
2 Although the middle voice does not exist in modern English, we see traces of in phrases 
VXFKDVWKHEXPSHUVWLFNHUVUHPLQGLQJXVWKDWµVWKDSSHQV¶ 
3 I spent 2 years living and working at Brockwood Park School, the only Krishnamurti school 
in the UK. I have also visited a number of Krishnamurti schools in India, as well as Oak Grove 
the Krishnamurti school in California. For many years Brockwood Park has committed all staff 
and students to a morning meeting which usually, though not always, would involve sitting 
quietly for 15 minutes.  
4 One of the key ideas that Stiegler rests his discussion upon is that attention is not simply 
there, but in capturing it, it is formed. This conception of attention formation would resist the 
ahistorical notion of attention:  ³7KHFRQVWLWXWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQUHVXOWVIURPDFFXPXODWLRQRIERWK
SULPDU\DQGVHFRQGDU\UHWHQWLRQVDQGWKHSURMHFWLRQRISURWHQVLRQVDVDQWLFLSDWLRQV´6WLHJOHU
2010, p. 18). 
5 UnderKLOOH[SOLFLWO\UHODWHVWKHFRQFHUQRISUD\HUWRSHGDJRJ\³It is the object of 
contemplative prayer, as it is the object of all education, to discipline and develop certain 
growing faculties´8QGHUKLOOS. 
